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COMMENT
Territorial Politics, Devolution and
Spatial Planning in the UK: Results,
Prospects, Lessons
CLAIRE COLOMB & JOHN TOMANEY
Abstract This article critically analyses the debates which have unfolded in the aftermath of the
Scottish independence referendum of 18 September 2014 concerning the constitutional arrange-
ments of the UK as a plurinational state and the internal governmental structure of England. The
debates unfolding in the UK reﬂect and illustrate two central themes in planning, territorial
development and public policy. First, they highlight the contested distribution of power across
multiple layers of government in states with an inherited centralized pattern of governance that
are now facing strengthening regionalist and nationalist claims. Second, they illustrate the linked
growth in the demand for new governance and strategic planning arrangements in large
metropolitan areas with fragmented administrative and institutional boundaries. The article ﬁrst
discusses what the outcome of the Scottish referendum (and its aftermath) means for planning in
Scotland. It then turns to the debates on devolution in the rest of UK which were stoked in the
wake of the referendum, looking at the planning implications of further devolution in Northern
Ireland and Wales, and at the possible consequences of the various options currently being aired
to solve the ‘English question’. Finally, ongoing debates on decentralization to regions and
city-regions in England are brieﬂy considered.
Keywords: devolution; decentralization; spatial planning; UK; England; Scotland; Wales;
Northern Ireland; regionalism; sub-state nationalism; city-regions; strategic planning
Introduction: Planning and the Constitutional Debates on Devolution and
Decentralization in the UK in the Aftermath of the Scottish Independence
Referendum
Far from settling the constitutional future of the UK, as some had hoped, the
rejection of independence by voters in the Scottish referendum on 18 September
2014 (by 55–45% with a record turnout of just under 85% of eligible voters) has
been accompanied by renewed debates about the constitutional arrangements of
this plurinational state. It has also brought back to the forefront of the political
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agenda the unsolved, complex question of the internal governmental structure of
England. The last-minute promises made by the three main UK political parties
for an extended package of devolution measures to Scotland in order to entice
voters to vote ‘no’,1 were followed, the day after the referendum, by a declara-
tion from the UK Prime Minister David Cameron linking the Scottish question
to the need for constitutional reforms in England (Wintour, 2014a), focusing on
more devolution to cities, city-regions or regions, on the one hand, and on
changes to the operation of the UK Parliament, on the other. A complicated and
confusing picture has emerged of complex demands for various forms of devolu-
tion at different scales, often bundled together in public and media debates in the
tense atmosphere of the pre-referendum weeks.
The aim of this paper is to reﬂect on those debates and what they mean for
the future of territorial development policies and spatial planning in the UK. The
debates unfolding in the UK, brieﬂy analysed here for the beneﬁt of an interna-
tional audience, have relevance for other countries (Katz, 2014). They reﬂect and
illustrate two central themes in planning, territorial development and public pol-
icy. First, we are concerned with the contested distribution of power across mul-
tiple layers of government in states characterized by an inherited centralized
pattern of governance and that now face emerging (or strengthening) regionalist
and nationalist claims. Second, we identify the demand for new governance and
strategic planning arrangements in large metropolitan areas with fragmented
administrative and institutional boundaries as a facet of broader devolutionary
processes. Both themes have become major topics of political debate in various
European countries (and beyond) over the past decade. Countries such as Spain,
Belgium and Italy have been confronted with a strengthening of sub-state nation-
alist and regionalist movements, whose arguments related to the ‘politics of terri-
torial solidarity’ (Béland & Lecours, 2008), to territorial justice, spatial
redistribution and the planning and ﬁnancing of large-scale infrastructure have
gained new ground (Colomb et al., 2014). In parallel, across European and North
American countries with mature but fragmented forms of local government, there
have been recurring debates about, and various experiments with, new forms of
metropolitan and city-regional governance to tackle the challenges posed by the
urbanization patterns of the past decades and underpin the competitiveness of
national economies via support to dynamic cities and regions. Both sets of
debates have been taking place, in recent years, in the context of the austerity
politics and reforms carried out by central governments following the 2008
global recession.
Planning as a state activity (understood here in a broad sense) and as a form
of public policy is closely bound with debates on constitutional arrangements
and the need for evolving multi-level governance structures in changing states. It
is also closely bound with long-standing debates on the transformation of the
central and local state in territorial management in a post-Fordist or
post-Keynesian era. In the UK context, reform of the governance of planning has
been loosely (and incoherently) connected with the objective of ‘rebalancing’ the
‘national’ economy, that is, among other things, encouraging growth outside
London and the South-East of England (Pike et al., 2015). With the objective of
balanced territorial development in mind, it is crucial to consider whether new
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constitutional and governance arrangements would improve the ‘internal
governance of uneven development’ (Pike & Tomaney, 2009) both between and
within the nations of the UK. The paper ﬁrst discusses what the outcome of the
Scottish referendum (and its aftermath) means for planning in Scotland. It then
turns to the debates on devolution in the rest of UK which were stoked in the
wake of the referendum, looking at the planning implications of further devolu-
tion in Northern Ireland and Wales, and at the implications of the various options
currently being aired to solve the ‘English question’.2 Finally, ongoing debates
on decentralization to regions and city-regions in England are considered. In the
conclusion, we reﬂect about the signiﬁcance of the developments analysed in the
UK in their European and international context.
What the Outcome of the Referendum Means for Planning in Scotland
The ﬁnal outcome of the referendum on Scottish independence reﬂected the most
likely outcome predicted not just by pollsters, but also by long-standing analysts
of Scottish society who had noted that a majority of Scots, in social surveys car-
ried out over several years, displayed a consistent preference for a ‘devo-max’
type of settlement (i.e. implying the largest amount of devolved power consistent
with remaining in the UK) – a path which was not offered as an option in the
referendum (McCrone, 2014). Many undecided voters thus asked themselves,
until the last moment, which of the two options offered to them would most
likely secure the type of settlement they most wished to see. The hastily made
promises for more devolution made by the three main UK parties shortly before
the vote, when an opinion poll showed that the predicted gap between the ‘yes’
and ‘no’ votes had signiﬁcantly narrowed, is likely to have inﬂuenced the choice
made by many of those voters.3
Since the Scotland Act of 1998, which brought about extensive devolution for
Scotland, the Scottish Parliament has full responsibility for spatial planning and
related ﬁelds such as transport and local government. The reforms introduced by
the ﬁrst two Scottish Governments (a coalition between Labour and Liberal-
Democrats) until 2010, mainly through the Planning etc. (Scotland) Act 2006,
echoed many of the planning reforms passed in England at the same time by the
then New Labour government (Nadin, 2007; Lloyd & Peel, 2009). From 2010
onwards, the newly elected UK coalition government (Conservative-Liberal
Democrat) set out to reform the planning system through the 2011 Localism Act
which dismantled many of New Labour’s spatial planning initiatives (Davoudi,
2011; Haughton & Allmendinger, 2012; Rozee, 2014). Following the electoral
victory of the Scottish National Party (SNP, a left-of-centre nationalist party) in
the Scottish Parliamentary election in 2011, a divergence between the planning
policy agendas of the Scottish and UK Governments became more apparent
(Tomaney & Colomb, 2013).
Spatial planning in Scotland acquired a relatively high proﬁle on the political
agenda of the SNP government post-2011. While similarities remained in the
respective planning discourses of the English and Scottish Governments in the
post-recession era – e.g. the emphasis on ‘sustainable economic growth’ and
calls for more efﬁciency in development management (the system and processes
Territorial Politics, Devolution and Spatial Planning in the UK
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of planning control and permission) – the Scottish Government exhibited a clear
belief in the value of planning as a positive means of steering spatial develop-
ment, in stark contrast to the dominant political discourse of the UK governing
coalition. The strategic and visionary element of planning was seen as supporting
the SNP’s vision of an independent, prosperous, low carbon Scotland (ibid.). In
recent years, there has, however, been some debate about the extent of this
divergence and distinctiveness (Keating, 2005; Allmendinger, 2006; Clifford &
Morphet, 2015; Morphet & Clifford, 2014), but evidence suggests that the
devolution arrangements of the late 1990s in the UK have allowed greater exper-
imentation to occur in planning strategies and delivery styles, i.e. have generated
a diversity of ‘spatial plannings’ between and within the nations of the UK,
highlighting ‘distinctiveness in territorial management in the broader sense’
(Haughton et al., 2009, p. 12; see also Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 2006;
Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010).
Following the ‘no’ vote in the Scottish referendum, what trajectory of change
has been identiﬁable in the Scottish planning agenda? The 3rd National Planning
Framework (NPF3) for Scotland, which was published just before the referendum
in the summer of 2014 following an extensive consultation process, included a
positive vision for the territory of Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014). It was
presented as the spatial expression of the SNP government’s Economic Strategy
(Scottish Government, 2010), setting out a 20–30 year vision for development and
investment across Scotland. It aimed to support ‘sustainable economic growth’
and the transition to a low-carbon economy, emphasizing the need to balance
economic growth with the conservation of natural assets, the stewardship of natu-
ral resources and the development of renewable energy. Additionally, themes of
social, regional and inter-generational equity ﬁgured prominently as policy
objectives in the NPF and in the Scottish Government’s Economic Strategy in
ways that were absent in the UK coalition Government’s National Planning Policy
Framework for England (DCLG, 2012; Tomaney & Colomb, 2013).
Scottish Planning Policy and the NPF are seen as instruments to guide plan-
ning decisions in a range of sectors such as economic development, regeneration,
energy, environment, climate change, transport and digital infrastructure. Their
success will be linked to their capacity to inﬂuence the investment decisions of
the Scottish Government, public agencies, local planning authorities and private
investors, as well as to the ﬁnancing capacity of the Scottish Government.4 The
Scottish Government’s room for manoeuvre has been limited by its inability to
borrow directly on capital markets to fund infrastructure projects. Additionally,
while many of the levers that could assist the NPF implementation are in the
hands of the Scottish Parliament, the UK Parliament at Westminster retains com-
petence in some key policy areas, such as taxation, energy and airports, which
are fundamental levers in shaping the territorial and spatial development of any
territory. Energy policy and the regulation of energy grids and markets are not a
devolved matter: this is a source of contention between the Scottish and UK
Governments because of the SNP’s rejection of nuclear power and strong support
for the development of renewable energy.
In the negotiations over a post-referendum devolution package for Scotland,
energy and taxation powers therefore appear to be central themes which will
Claire Colomb & John Tomaney
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inﬂuence the implementation of the Scottish Government’s future planning
agenda. A commission was set up immediately after the referendum to prepare
proposals for more devolution to Scotland and delivered its ﬁnal report in a short
timeframe (Smith Commission, 2014). The commission proposed inter alia that
the Scottish Parliament should have power to set income tax rates and bands;
receive a proportion of the VAT raised in Scotland; have control over air passen-
ger duty levied in Scottish airports, over the licensing of onshore oil and gas
extraction underlying Scotland and over a number of welfare beneﬁts, in particu-
lar housing beneﬁts. The Smith Commission offered limited new powers for bor-
rowing to the Scottish Government.5 It also proposed that the Scottish Parliament
should obtain responsibility for the management of, and the revenue generated
from, the Crown Estate’s economic assets in Scotland (seabed, urban assets, rural
estates, mineral and ﬁshing rights, and the Scottish foreshore), suggesting that
‘responsibility for the management of those assets will be further devolved to
local authority areas such as Orkney, Shetland, Na h-Eilean Siar or other areas
who seek such responsibilities’ (ibid., p. 16). This is one of the few references to
‘devolution downwards’ within Scotland, something welcome by those who have
argued that the devolution process post-1999 has led to a ‘creeping centralization’
and excessive centralism in Scottish governance (McGarvey, 2014).
Nicola Sturgeon, who became the SNP leader and Scotland’s First Minister in
the aftermath of the referendum, welcomed the Smith proposals but argued they
were not bold enough for the Scottish Government to create jobs and reduce
social inequality, because the Scottish Parliament does not have control over, for
example, the minimum wage and national insurance contributions (Brooks,
2014). The Smith proposals offer neither ‘devo-max’ nor ‘near federalism’
(Keating, 2014a), and if judged according to whether they give the Scottish
Parliament the powers needed to foster growth and social cohesion, may be
inadequate (Keating, 2014b). A command paper was published by the UK
Government in January 2015 setting out the draft legislation which would enact
some of the commitments made in the Smith Commission’s report (HM
Government, 2015). The UK general election of May 2015 gave the Conserva-
tive Party a small overall majority of seats in the Westminster Parliament, ending
the coalition with the Liberal-Democrats, which suffered dramatic losses. In
Scotland, the election marked a sweeping, spectacular victory for the SNP, which
won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats, in most cases at the expense of the Labour
Party.6 This means that the SNP is the third largest party in the UK House of
Commons. Following the election, the Conservative government spelled out its
proposed Scotland Bill, which broadly reﬂects the Smith Commission proposals.
The SNP’s electoral victory led the Scottish First Minister to claim that the pro-
posed Bill was not going far enough and to demand more substantial powers to
be devolved to Scotland (Brooks, 2015).
In terms of planning policy, the ﬁrst signs sent by the UK Conservative gov-
ernment following the 2015 election point towards the continuation of an agenda
combining a pro-development relaxation of planning policies with the further
pursuit of the localism and decentralization agenda initiated in 2010 (further
discussed below). In 2016, a parliamentary election will take place in Scotland.
If the SNP maintains its discourse and agenda as ‘left-of-centre’ – with a ﬁrmly
Territorial Politics, Devolution and Spatial Planning in the UK
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social-democratic outlook on the role of the state – and if it conﬁrms its electoral
success, the divergence in attitude to planning as a state activity between
England and Scotland will continue to be noticeable, in spite of a shared concern
to streamline development planning and housing delivery apparent in the policy
discourse of both the UK and Scottish Governments.7 In July 2015, the Scottish
Government launched an informal consultation on what a fairer Scotland should
look like in 2030, including a reference to the principle of territorial cohesion or
spatial justice, not named as such but deﬁned as ‘where you are born, where you
live, or who you are doesn’t stop you having the opportunity to reach your full
potential’ (Scottish Government, 2015). As noted by the Director of the RTPI
Scotland, planning plays a key role in supporting that agenda, as it ‘can support
improvements in health, in the quality of service provision, in community safety,
in local facilities, in providing affordable housing, in community engagement
and empowerment, and in working to maximize the potential of places’
(McLaren, 2015, np).
Since the referendum, the key areas of planning-related activities of the
Scottish Government have included energy policy (including a ban on fracking
for shale gas), the Community Empowerment Bill (passed in June 2015, see
Scottish Parliament, 2015a), and land reform – a sensitive and contentious issue
which was put on hold prior to the referendum. The Land Reform (Scotland) Bill
was introduced to the Scottish Parliament on 22 June 2015 (The Economist,
2015; Wightman, 2015a, 2015b; Scottish Parliament, 2015b). It includes propos-
als that are strongly opposed by the Conservatives and large land owners (of
which it has been estimated 432 control half of the privately owned land in
Scotland), such as powers to force the sale of private land to community groups
and improvements in both the common good land regime and ‘right to roam’
arrangements.
The UK Constitutional Debate and its Implications for Planning in the
Other Nations of the UK
Shortly before the referendum, the three main party leaders did not only promise
more devolution to Scotland, but also pledged to deliver ‘home rule within the
UK’ beyond Scotland (as stated by the former prime minister Gordon Brown), in
order to appease politicians and voters from Northern Ireland, Wales and
England (Henley, 2014; Wintour, 2014b). Several politicians called for a UK
‘constitutional convention’ to open a broad debate about the transformation of
the ‘Westminster model’ and of the ‘state of unions’ (Mitchell, 2010) which
emerged from the ad hoc, incremental process of asymmetric devolution initiated
by New Labour in the late 1990s.8 The ‘absence of devolution in England (other
than the Mayor and Assembly in London), Scottish legislative devolution, the
Welsh Assembly with modest primary legislative powers, and the consociational
institutions of Northern Ireland reﬂect and entrench long established asymme-
tries’ (ibid., p. 86) which are now being widely questioned.
The post-conﬂict conditions of Northern Ireland (NI), where the signing of the
Good Friday Agreement in 1998 brought an end to three decades of violence, give
events there a particular dynamic. In the aftermath of the Scottish referendum,
Claire Colomb & John Tomaney
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attention was on the protracted negotiation of a ‘Stormont Agreement’ between
the various parties in the NI and UK Governments (Boland, 2014; HM Govern-
ment, 2014). This agreement, following months of deadlock which threatened the
power-sharing arrangements born out of the peace process, partly focused on the
implementation of the UK Government’s desired welfare and ﬁnancial cuts
(Birrell, 2015), but included other signiﬁcant aspects such as the devolution of
responsibility for the raising of corporation tax – a power which even Scotland
lacks – ostensibly allowing NI to compete (or cooperate) with the Republic of
Ireland for mobile investment. This agreement, which proved fragile, was heavily
contested at the time of writing (McDonald, 2015; Morrow, 2015) and had even
raised the prospect of a (temporary) suspension of the devolved government in
Belfast and the possible withdrawal of the proposal to devolve corporation tax
(McDonnell, 2015).
Alongside these developments, an equally contentious reform of the NI local
government and planning system involved the reduction in the number of local
authorities and the devolution of powers from the NI Executive to 11 new dis-
trict councils which took effect on 1 April 2015 (NI DoE, 2015; Tilley, 2015).
This includes planning (including local development plan-making and develop-
ment management); area-based urban regeneration and community development.
The NI Executive retains responsibility for ‘regionally signiﬁcant’ planning
applications. The context for these changes was a system in which local authori-
ties were stripped of a wide range of powers in the late 1960s (including plan-
ning) and only had a consultative role. According to the Planning (Northern
Ireland) Order 1991, local plan preparation, development control and enforce-
ment were in the hands of the NI Department of the Environment. But the effort
to reform the system has been slow and fraught. The devolution of planning
powers to NI local authorities is a challenging process which requires capacity
building and a ‘culture change’ (Blackman, 2015). Additionally, a proposed
Northern Ireland Planning Bill was withdrawn by the Planning Minister Mark
Durkan in late 2013 (Sell, 2013), although some of the aborted Bill’s provisions
were implemented through administrative action. A draft Strategic Planning
Policy Statement for NI was consulted upon in 2014 (NI DoE, 2014) and was
due to be published in its ﬁnal form in 2015.
In Wales, where public support for independence reportedly dipped to a low
point (3%) in the aftermath of the Scottish referendum, but where a signiﬁcant
part of the population supports more devolution to the Welsh National Assembly
(Morris, 2014), the nationalist party Plaid Cymru has called for Wales to receive
the same powers as Scotland (in the event of further powers being devolved to
Scotland) (Plaid Cymru, 2014). While The Government of Wales Act 2006
enhanced the Welsh Assembly’s powers, Wales has a ‘conferred powers’ model
which differs from Scotland and Northern Ireland, which have a ‘reserved pow-
ers’ model. In the former, the Welsh National Assembly has speciﬁc powers
granted to it by the UK Parliament; in the latter, powers are held by the Scottish
Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly unless they are speciﬁcally
reserved to the UK Parliament. The Commission on Devolution in Wales (2014)
advocated a ‘reserved powers’ model for Wales, which would offer more clarity,
consistency and equity across the devolved nations of the UK. It also supported
Territorial Politics, Devolution and Spatial Planning in the UK
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the devolution of certain tax and borrowing powers and speciﬁc planning powers
to allow the Welsh Assembly to manage Welsh natural resources more
effectively. It recommended, in particular, that all energy planning consents
(non-renewable and renewable) below 350 MW should be devolved; and that the
UK Government should have a statutory duty to take account of Welsh planning
policies when exercising its retained responsibilities for larger projects. Other
proposals relate to the devolution of regulatory powers over transport including
ports, rail, buses and taxis; possible elements of social protection (e.g. housing)
and control over the Crown Estate – all of them relevant for planning policy.
Several (although not all) of these proposals were taken on board in the plans
proposed by the UK Government in its command paper of February 2015 (Wales
Ofﬁce, 2015). Following the May 2015 general election, the new Conservative
government’s priorities included plans to grant new powers to the Welsh Assem-
bly in the ﬁelds of energy, transport and the running of elections. These were
criticized by Plaid Cymru as very limited in comparison to the powers devolved
(or planned to be) to Scotland (BBC News, 2015). A draft version of the new
Wales Bill was announced for the end of 2015.
A signiﬁcant part of planning competences has already been devolved to the
Welsh Government, which has a duty under the Government of Wales Act 2006
to promote sustainable development. The ﬁrst Wales Spatial Plan was approved
in 2004 and updated in 2008. The Welsh Government introduced the Planning
(Wales) Bill to the National Assembly in October 2014 to propose a reform of
the planning system. The Planning (Wales) Act was approved by the Welsh
Assembly in May 2015, and has been described as the foundation for a ‘renais-
sance of strategic planning’ in Wales (Morris, 2015). The Act foresees the prepa-
ration of a National Development Framework by 2018 (which will replace the
Wales Spatial Plan) and the introduction of Strategic Development Plans for
some parts of the country to tackle larger-than-local cross-boundary issues (e.g.
in Cardiff and Swansea), in addition to existing Local Development Plans. In
combination with two other pieces of legislation – the Environment (Wales) Bill
and the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, the Welsh planning
system is being geared towards supporting the sustainable use, management and
development of Welsh resources, as the country is likely to be strongly affected
by the impacts of climate change. A reform of local government has also been
under discussion, to reduce the number of local authorities from 22 to 8.
On the day after the Scottish referendum in September 2014, David Cameron
tied his declaration about further devolution for Scotland to the English question,
more speciﬁcally the ‘West Lothian’ question.9 The Conservatives proposed
restricting the rights of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish MPs in the UK Parlia-
ment to vote on matters relevant for England only (an approach labelled ‘English
votes for English laws’).10 The context for this proposal was signs of stirring Eng-
lish nationalism (Jeffery et al., 2014; Kenny, 2014) and the rise in popularity of
the populist UK Independence Party. An additional motivation was the Conserva-
tives’ attempt to compromise the Labour Party, which has on occasion relied on
the votes of Scottish MPs to enact its ‘English legislation’ in the UK Parliament.
While all political parties now recognize that the West Lothian question needs
be addressed, there is no agreement on how to do this, as each seeks to defend
Claire Colomb & John Tomaney
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its party interest and partisan advantage (McAngus, 2014). The ‘English
question’ could hypothetically be solved through the creation of an English Par-
liament, but this option is not currently favoured by mainstream parties nor by
English voters.11 The Conservatives wish to give English (or English and Welsh)
MPs an exclusive right to pass laws that affect the two countries through various
proposals which would amend the functioning of the House of Commons
(Wintour, 2014c), something Labour is unwilling to do. The debate about the
English question has thus been characterized by ‘political tactics’ and little con-
cern for principles of democratic representation (Jeffery, 2015). The practical
effect of ‘English votes for English laws’ would potentially make it more difﬁ-
cult for the Labour party to achieve the necessary share of votes in the Houses
of Parliament to pass legislation concerning England. In the planning ﬁeld, this
means that a continuation of the reforms launched in 2010 would be likely, and
that this would limit, in England, the prospects for the return of regional strategic
planning or an explicit national redistributive urban and regional policy.
While ‘English votes for English laws’ would appear, on the surface, to pro-
mise an answer to the pressure from public opinion in England (Jeffery et al.,
2014), it would most likely not address public concerns – wide across and within
all the constituent units of the UK, including England – that power has become
too remote from voters’ daily concerns (Garlick, 2014) and too centred on the
economic and territorial interest of the population of London and the South-East
of England. Partly in response to this problem, David Cameron in his
post-referendum speech raised the possibility of devolution to big cities in Eng-
land and in the process (re)opening the possibility of devolution within England.
The bundling together by senior politicians and by many media commentators
of the question of further devolution to constituent nations of the UK with that
of the devolution of powers to cities and/or regions reveals unresolved tensions
between different types and scales of devolution or decentralization which are
incommensurable. No amount of ‘devolution to city-regions’ can act as ersatz
substitute for a full debate on the relationship between the four constituent
nations of the UK. The word ‘devolution’ typically has been used in recent polit-
ical discourse with a lack of precision regarding its meaning. Political scientists
working on federal systems have long developed typologies to clarify the differ-
ence between different types of ‘devolution’ or ‘decentralization’. Decentraliza-
tion means that power is shared between tiers of government and that lower tier
units – such as regions, provinces or municipalities – exercise some form of self-
governance. The kind and amount of autonomy exercised by lower tiers vary
across and within states along administrative, ﬁscal and political axes (Rodden,
2004; Treisman, 2007). The issue of the appropriate scale of decentralization
within England brings together complex demands for economic functionality,
policy efﬁciency, urban and regional identity and democratic legitimacy.
Answering the ‘English Question’ through Decentralization to City-regions
and Cities?
In this context, the UK coalition government formed in 2010 proposed decentral-
ization to city-regions, an agenda pursued by the Conservative government
Territorial Politics, Devolution and Spatial Planning in the UK
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re-elected in 2015. The idea of city-regions as focus for decentralization
measures is not new and is part of long-standing debates about the reform of
local government in England and the lack of congruence between existing gover-
nance arrangements and functional economic areas in metropolitan areas, but has
gained momentum in the context of the Scottish referendum. A variety of think
tanks, ad hoc commissions and politicians advocated the decentralization of pow-
ers to (large) cities and metropolitan areas in England (DBIS, 2012; Clark &
Clark, 2014; IPPR North, 2014; Policy Network, 2014; Rogers, 2014; RSA,
2014a; Centre for Cities, 2014a, 2014b). Underpinning this advocacy are a set of
claims about the economic role of cities, the value of metropolitan-scale planning
and local government cooperation processes and the effectiveness of enhanced
local decision-making, notably in the form of a directly elected ‘metro-mayor’
(Glaeser, 2012; Barber, 2013; Katz & Bradley, 2014). A growing and largely
unchallenged consensus has developed around these proposals in the UK con-
text, although a variety of approaches and models have been advocated. There is
no consensus in the international literature on metropolitan governance as to
which model offers the best return in terms of efﬁciency in policy delivery,
economic dividends and strategic planning (Nelson & Foster, 1999). In OECD
countries, a wide variety of governance arrangements has been used over the past
decades to deal with the city-regional question (OECD, 2006). Since a formal
process of local government reorganization (e.g. by abolition and amalgamation)
is a politically sensitive option – in the UK and elsewhere – cooperative arrange-
ments through inter-municipal joint authorities are often favoured. In England,
outside of London there are now ﬁve combined authorities and 15 directly
elected local authority (municipal) mayors (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2014).
The most signiﬁcant development in this context was the signing of the
‘Greater Manchester Agreement’ between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and
the leaders of 10 local councils in Greater Manchester on 3 November 2014
(Jenkins, 2015). This proposed the establishment of a directly elected mayor for
Greater Manchester, with the power, among other things, to create a statutory
spatial development plan for the city-region which will include provisions for
employment land, housing and infrastructure to 2033 (HM Treasury & GMCA,
2014). The plan will be prepared jointly, but adopted individually by local coun-
cils, which began a consultation on the plan in 2014 (AGMA, 2014; Geoghegan,
2014a). This power will be accompanied by a consolidated and devolved trans-
port budget, bus franchising powers and a £300 million Housing Investment
Fund. This agreement signals the return of statutory spatial planning in England
which was abolished by the coalition government in 2010 (except in London,
where there continues to be a London Plan). The Greater Manchester Agreement
needs to be set in the context of the longer term development of the ‘Manchester
Model’ and is the culmination of gradual initiatives which started with the
formation of the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities in 1986
(Tomaney & McCarthy, 2015).
The ‘Manchester Model’ is now frequently presented as a set of governance
arrangements and mode of economic development to which other city-regions
should aspire (The Economist, 2013a, 2013b; Geoghegan, 2014b). Notably, at a
time when politicians nationally have presented planning as an inhibitor of
Claire Colomb & John Tomaney
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growth, the ‘Manchester Model’ appears to provide the framework for the devel-
opment of strategic spatial planning, which is given a central status in economic
strategy. The concentration of political attention on Manchester reﬂects a belief
among policy elites that only Manchester has the potential to act as a northern
growth pole to rival London (McDermott, 2015). The Royal Society of Arts, for
instance, argues against a one-size ﬁts all solution, proposing a ‘selective’ devo-
lution to ‘ready and able’ city-regions like Manchester which have already been
successful in running their own affairs at a strategic scale, while other metropoli-
tan areas ‘will need to wait until their economic performance, potential and gov-
ernance structures lend themselves to devolution’ (RSA, 2014b, p. 9). This
thinking is apparent in the UK Government’s preference to establish bespoke (or
idiosyncratic) ‘devolution deals’ with a small number of city-regions (Policy
Network, 2014). This pragmatic, deal-making and discretionary approach to
devolution has the potential to create a complex, multi-speed system in England,
which combined with processes of central government funding allocation could
reshape and accentuate patterns of uneven economic development. From a spatial
planning and territorial cohesion perspective, the current debates about decentral-
ization to city-regions in England consequently have to be critically examined
within the broader context of two related trends: the ‘localist’ agenda of the cen-
tral government and the impacts of its austerity politics on local authorities; the
abolition of the regional scale of economic governance and spatial planning and
the subsequent tension between decentralization and territorial cohesion in a
divided England (Pike et al., 2015; Tomaney & McCarthy, 2015).
Localism, Austerity and the Prospects for Devolution in England
The prospects for devolution in England lie at the intersection of the politics of
‘localism’ and austerity. Localism and the ‘Big Society’ were buzzwords in the
early days of the UK coalition government in 2010 (Swain & Baden, 2012).
Both terms were vaguely deﬁned, but rhetorically signalled a reduced role for
the state in the management of urban and regional change and a shift of power
from the central state beyond local authorities to ‘local communities’ (DCLG,
2010). In planning terms, the apparatus of spatial planning established by the
previous Labour government in the form of Regional Development Agencies
and Regional Spatial Strategies was abolished by the incoming government
(Haughton & Allmendinger, 2012; Rozee, 2014). Newly instituted non-statutory
local enterprise partnerships in theory brought together public and private actors
at a local scale in order to promote local economic growth (Pike et al., 2015).
This ‘downscaling’ of planning has been accompanied by concerns over the sys-
tem’s ability to achieve broader and longer term spatial objectives (Baker &
Wong, 2013; Boddy & Hickman, 2013; Gallent et al., 2013). In the 2011 Local-
ism Act the coalition government stipulated a formal ‘Duty to Cooperate’ for
local authorities to work with their neighbours in the preparation of their devel-
opment plans. In parallel, a new tier of ‘neighbourhood planning’ was introduced
to give the possibility to local residents to prepare a plan for a designed area
(DCLG, 2014; Locality, 2015). Underlying these approaches is the assumption
that a proliferation of local and neighbourhood plans and their attendant
Territorial Politics, Devolution and Spatial Planning in the UK
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spillovers can be resolved through cooperative and voluntaristic means. In 2015,
tensions had become apparent within the Conservative government’s agenda
between, on the one hand, the promise to take the decentralization and localism
agenda further (by giving more power to local authorities and local communities
over the control of development), and on the other, the imposition of top-down
pressures for local authorities to accept new developments at all costs and release
land for housing (HM Treasury, 2015; Wintour & Mason, 2015).
The localism agenda of the Conservative government has thus been shaped by
pervasive traditions of centralism in UK governance, and has additionally been
conditioned by austerity politics, in the context of a country – England – which
has the most centrally controlled system of public ﬁnance of any major OECD
country (RSA, 2014b). Only seven per cent of all the taxes paid by local resi-
dents and businesses is retained by local councils (LFC, 2013). Local authorities,
especially in northern England, are faced with drastic cuts of central government
funding allocation but retain signiﬁcant statutory responsibilities for local
services. One consequence among many is the rapid downsizing of many local
planning departments in spite of new tasks (e.g. the ‘Duty to Cooperate’ men-
tioned above). According to the leader of Newcastle City Council, continued
reductions in council budgets means ‘there will be nothing left for government
to devolve to’ (quoted in Harris, 2014).
The Manchester experience points to a form of decentralization of powers and
resources based on combinations of local authorities which negotiate deals with
the central government. This contrasts with decentralization and local government
reforms in many of the UK’s European neighbours, such as France – with 36,000
municipalities a country with extreme municipal fragmentation. The French
reforms, which started in the 1960s, have combined a degree of top-down imposi-
tion by central government with a bottom-up process of voluntary cooperation
between neighbouring local authorities against the backdrop of increasing ﬁscal
autonomy offered to all local authorities across the country. Just under 50% of the
income of municipal governments in France comes from locally levied taxes
(OFL, 2014). The emerging English city-regional arrangements thus exhibit a cru-
cial difference with the French model, in which inter-municipal groupings and
metropolitan cooperation entities are endowed with a share of local taxes and are
thus potentially able to act as a territorially equalizing force. This takes place
within the context of a nation-wide system of horizontal and vertical equalization
aiming at ‘supporting structurally disadvantaged local authorities while maintain-
ing an incentive for authorities to carry out proactive local development policies’
(OFL, 2014, p. 191). The current debates on decentralization to city-regions in
England thus cannot be separated from debates on ﬁscal decentralization and a
signiﬁcant increase in tax raising powers for local councils.
Scales of Economic Governance and Spatial Planning & the Question of
Territorial Cohesion in a Divided England
At present, city-regions and combined authorities are the main options being
promoted by the three main UK parties to ﬁll in the ‘missing middle’ (Shaw &
Greenhalgh, 2010) in English sub-national governance. A few voices have
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stressed that an aggregation of ad hoc city-regions is not enough to do so, and
have called for directly and proportionally elected regional parliaments ‘with big
constituencies forcing members to “think regionally” and devolved powers over
transport, regional development, a single police force, strategic healthcare, the
environment and tourism’ (Henley, 2014, np). However, there is little public sup-
port and political appetite to reconsider the option of either functional regional-
ism (through regional agencies such as the defunct RDAs) or political
regionalism (through elected regional assemblies with powers comparable to
regions in neighbouring European countries).12 In planning terms, this raises the
question whether decentralization to a selected few city-regions, without the
development of broader regional territorial and economic development strategies,
may fuel the creation of an archipelago of dynamic metropolitan areas sur-
rounded by a hinterland of small towns and rural areas struggling with issues of
demographic and economic decline (Waite et al., 2013). This question has been
raised in other national contexts in the framework of the post-Keynesian transfor-
mation of the role of the central state in the management of territorial and regio-
nal inequalities. In many European countries, the state has shifted its priorities
from regional development policies aimed at assisting lagging areas or declining
regions to interventions aimed at improving the performance of (already)
dynamic cities and regions (Brenner, 2004; Crouch & Le Galès, 2012), leading
to a multiplication of the scales of economic governance and spatial planning
(Harrison, 2012). The ‘champion city’ approach of the main UK parties is thus
not unique: ‘advancing favoured places within their national territories has
become one of the few forms of substantive economic policy left to national
governments within European and global competition regimes’ (Crouch & Le
Galès, 2012, p. 417).
There is, however, a clear tension between this approach and the pursuit of
more even levels of economic development across the national territory – i.e.
territorial cohesion. For particular policy issues and societal risks that need to be
addressed through a pooling of resources, size matters. This is not just the case
for social security and welfare issues, as Gordon Brown stressed in the powerful
speech made a few days prior to the Scottish referendum.13 The most pressing
planning issues in England – a North–South divide that is neither sustainable for
the residents of the ‘North’ nor for the residents of the overheated South-East; a
chronic shortage of affordable, adequate housing for signiﬁcant parts of the
English population; the threat of climate change, resource depletion and natural
disasters such as ﬂooding; the needed improvements in transport infrastructure –
all demand strategic planning at a scale that may be higher than the city or
city-region. Some degree of higher level adjudication is important to reconcile
conﬂicting territorial interests in order to secure key infrastructure, amenities or
housing developments across the territory.
In that regard the experience of highly decentralized nations with unsettled
regionalist/nationalist claims, like Belgium, is enlightening. It shows that spatial
planning can become a means of strengthening the cultural and political
boundaries between regions and communities, unless strong mechanisms for
inter-regional co-operation and/or redistribution are put in place (Tomaney &
Colomb, 2014), as exempliﬁed in the disputes between Flanders and the Brussels
Territorial Politics, Devolution and Spatial Planning in the UK
13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:40
 23
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
Capital Region (Boussauw et al., 2013). The Belgian case might be rather
extreme, but it raises broader questions concerning redistributive and spatial
justice across the national territory. In the current UK devolution and decentral-
ization debates, scarcely any attention has been paid to these issues by the main
Westminster parties. Yet as ad hoc and uneven processes of devolution at various
scales continue, these considerations will matter. Decentralization by itself ‘is not
a panacea for automatic growth and development’, and debates about it cannot
avoid the central question of ‘what decentralisation is for and what it is hoping
to achieve’ (O’Brien & Pike, 2014).
There is a debate waiting in the wings about how to reconcile the need to
devolve power and resources to regional or local authorities and communities
with some (socially and politically agreed) form of social equity across the com-
ponents of the national territory.14 Proliferating localism will not provide an
answer to this question (Toynbee, 2014). As with any rescaling of government
and governance, ‘there is the potential for a radical reworking of the distribution
of winners and losers in both societal and spatial terms, which may be progres-
sive or it may be regressive’ (Haughton et al., 2009, p. 10). The question
becomes under what conditions does ‘localism’ work, i.e. which other reforms
and solidarity mechanisms or forms of regional policy should accompany it.
Local tax raising powers might not be enough to return growth to parts of
Northern England when such an unequal, persistent geography of regional devel-
opment exist within the UK and England. This is backed by recent reviews of
international experiences of regional devolution which show that there is
limited evidence that any economic dividend of devolution has
emerged yet, but this remains difﬁcult to discern because the likely
effects are overridden by the role of national economic growth in deci-
sively shaping the pattern of spatial disparities and in determining the
scope and effects of spatial economic policy and decentralisation. (Pike
et al., 2012, p. 25)
Results, Prospects, Lessons
Public and political debates in the UK in the aftermath of the Scottish referen-
dum have recurrently, and confusingly, mixed two questions which should be
dealt with separately, if in parallel: the question of constitutional change, i.e.
devolution to, and relationship between the four nations of the UK, and the inter-
nal decentralization of power to cities and regions in England (and in each of the
other devolved nations). The UK case, in spite of its idiosyncracies (e.g. the
absence of a written constitution), can be placed into a comparative perspective
if analysed within the context of the two broader themes referred to in the intro-
duction. First, developments in the UK echo those taking place in states where
historical patterns of centralization have been gradually challenged through
waves of decentralization, the outcome of which remains contested, in particular
those with ‘asymmetrical devolution’ (such as Spain). The different planning
agendas which seem to have emerged in the devolved administrations of such
states (Colomb et al., 2014) are both an expression of potential policy divergence
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arising from decentralization and devolution, as well as one of the levers used by
regional governments in their claims for distinctiveness in territorial management
policies and in their agenda for greater devolution or independence. Second, the
debates surrounding city-regional governance in areas with fragmented adminis-
trative and institutional boundaries, while not new, have taken a new resonance
in the context of the austerity politics witnessed in many countries of the global
North post-2008, which have accelerated the demise of forms of inter-regional
redistribution and territorial equalization put in place in the post-war era. A par-
ticular feature of the UK case is the search of solutions to these challenges
through uncoordinated, ad hoc deal-making between the central government and
particular cities, which seems especially likely to produce unintended (and thus
contested) consequences.
Planners, geographers and political scientists have a speciﬁc contribution to
make to both sets of debates, by throwing light on the potential implications of
different models of state restructuring, devolution and decentralization from a
spatial development and territorial cohesion perspective. Politicians tend to view
such reconﬁgurations in a different way, by ﬁrst asking themselves what the
implications would be for their electoral prospects or that of their party. Planners
and geographers should therefore encourage contemporary political debates to
move beyond the political interests tied up with existing administrative bound-
aries and ask what appropriate scales of governance, decision-making and coop-
eration are needed to address particular policy issues and objectives for the
greatest good of the greatest number – scales that should ideally also be ones of
democratic accountability. Yet in an era when localism is heralded as a solution
to solve a wide range of development problems, strategic spatial planning is
‘neither regarded as a proper mechanism for policy coordination and creating
synergies nor as an effective means for policy delivery and strategic thinking
about the future’ (Waterhout et al., 2013, p. 145). Any discussion on constitu-
tional change and decentralization in the UK (and elsewhere) should therefore be
seized by planners and anyone concerned with local and regional development
as an opportunity to push forward a move positive vision of the role of planning
(Ellis & Henderson, 2014) that is desperately needed in the current political
context.
Notes
1. The Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal-Democrats.
2. Debates on devolution and decentralization in the UK are ongoing, and the facts reported in this paper
were correct as of the end of July 2015. For up-to-date analyses, see the blog of the ESRC Centre on
Constitutional Change: http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog.
3. A week before the referendum, the leaders of the three main UK parties (all in favour of the continuation
of the Union between Scotland and the rest of the UK), agreed on a pledge for the fast-track preparation
of a new Scotland Bill which would be ready for introduction to the UK Parliament after the May 2015
general election, and would grant more powers relating to income tax and housing beneﬁt if Scotland
voted ‘no’ to independence (Carrell & Mason, 2014).
4. NPF3 contains 14 large-scale national developments, including airport enhancements, carbon capture and
storage schemes, offshore infrastructure for renewable energy and grid infrastructure improvements.
5. The ﬁnancial grant from the UK Government to Scotland would continue to be determined via the
so-called Barnett formula (Shepherd, 2014), adjusted when powers are transferred. The report speciﬁes
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15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:40
 23
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
that neither the UK Government nor the Scottish Government should gain or lose ﬁnancially as a
consequence of devolving a speciﬁc power; however this issue remains politically contentious and
technically complex (Keating, 2015).
6. The SNP (as well as the Green Party) saw a surge in new memberships in the aftermath of the Scottish
referendum.
7. A summary of the UK parties’ planning agenda in their electoral manifestos for the May 2015 general
election is available at http://www.rtpi.org.uk/brieﬁng-room/general-election-2015/what-the-political-par
ties-say/.
8. For an overview of the extent of the devolution process in each nation of the UK, see Centre for Cities,
2014c.
9. So named after a Member of Parliament (MP) for West Lothian (one of the 32 council areas of Scotland),
Tam Dalyell, asked in a debate on devolution to Scotland and Wales on 14 November 1977 why an MP
from Scotland should be free to vote on English legislation at Westminster but no English MP could vote
on Scottish matters which would be controlled in the Scottish Parliament. See Carrell, 2014.
10. Shortly after the May 2015 election, the Conservative government made proposals to implement ‘English
votes for English laws’ through changes to the standing orders of the House of Commons rather than a
new bill. This was heavily contested by many MPs across parties and at the time of writing (end of July
2015), the decision on the proposal was subject to further debates.
11. This would have to be accompanied by the formalization of a federal structure for the UK and would
involve far-reaching changes in its institutions and political culture, e.g. a written constitution setting out
what are the competences of different tiers of government; a second chamber representing the federal
units (or an intergovernmental conference); and a mechanism for ﬁscal equalization between the four
nations, i.e. sharing resources in some deﬁned ﬁelds (Keating, 2014c). As noted by various commenta-
tors, such a form of federalism would not work in the UK because one of the federal units, England, with
85 per cent of the population, is signiﬁcantly bigger than the others, meaning that its parliament and
government would be much stronger and richer. Another proposal made by Gordon Brown was to turn
the House of Lords into a chamber of the nations and regions of the UK.
12. The latter option was parked in 2004 following the rejection by referendum of an elected assembly for
the North-East of England (Tomaney, 2002a, 2002b, 2006; Keating, 2006; Rallings & Thrasher, 2006;
Shaw & Robinson, 2007).
13. ‘We forget the uniquely progressive set of decisions agreed by Scotland, England, Wales and Northern
Ireland in the 20th century to pool and share all our risks and resources so that whatever your nationality,
you have equal social and economic rights of citizenship in the UK’ (Brown, 2014, np).
14. See for example the principle of ‘equivalent living conditions’ throughout the territory embedded in the
German constitution.
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